Naval War College Review
Volume 68
Number 2 Spring

Article 18

2015

In My View: Prestige and Participation
Joseph Forbes

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
Recommended Citation
Forbes, Joseph (2015) "In My View: Prestige and Participation," Naval War College Review: Vol. 68 : No. 2 , Article 18.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss2/18

This Additional Writing is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

Forbes: In My View: Prestige and Participation

IN MY VIEW

PRESTIGE AND PARTICIPATION

Sir:
To the section “The Pacific War,” pages 24–25, in Peter J. Dean’s Autumn 2014 article in this journal, “Amphibious Operations and the Evolution of Australian Defense Policy,” could be added discussion of the 1945 Australian operation against
previously bypassed Japanese-held areas and Australian operations against Dutch
Borneo. These operations were conceived, developed, and implemented because
of Australian domestic political and economic factors, the ambition of Australian
general Thomas Blamey and others who would execute these operations, and
long-range postwar political and diplomatic objectives. These operations were
opposed by General Douglas MacArthur.
The Australian people wanted their troops used in combat in 1945 or demobilized for civilian work. Anticipating these operations, Australian prime minister
John Curtin informed British prime minister Winston Churchill on 8 October
1943 (quoting hereafter from my article in the January 1985 Military Affairs),
“‘The Government [of Australia] considers it to be a matter of vital importance . . .
that her military effort should be concentrated as much as possible in the Pacific
and that it should be on a scale to guarantee her an effective voice in the peace
settlement.’ In June 1945, answering criticism of the use of Australian forces to
liquidate previously bypassed Japanese-held areas, Prime Minister [Ben] Chifley
explained, ‘From the aspect of prestige and participation in the Pacific peace settlement, it is of great imperative [sic] to Australia to be associated with the drive
to defeat Japan.’ At the San Francisco Conference a few weeks later, the Australian
representatives ‘stressed that the war effort that Australia has made and intends to
continue until Japan is defeated entitles us to a special consideration of our views
on and our part in the final Pacific settlement.’
[paragraph omitted]
“Prime Minister Curtin told his House of Representatives [on 24 April 1945]
the Australian government ‘considered it was both logical and appropriate that
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Australian forces should take over the islands which formed our outer screen of
defence and which were mostly our own territory.’ And he went on: ‘The Government accepts full responsibility for the operations that are being carried out.’ The
Australian general in charge, Blamey, kept MacArthur informed of those operations, but MacArthur, of course, gave ‘no specific instructions’ regarding them.
The local commander in these operations had ‘considerable freedom of action as
to methods to be employed.’ The Australian commanders involved chose ‘to carry
out active operations in effecting neutralization where other commanders might
decide on more passive measures.’
“When Curtin asked MacArthur his opinion of Blamey’s proposal ‘to attack the
Japanese instead of using passive defense measures,’ MacArthur told Curtin that
‘the tactics of the problem naturally were a responsibility of the local commander,’
but that he ‘was in disapproval of the method suggested as being unnecessary and
wasteful of lives and resources.’ MacArthur ‘advised him [Curtin] strongly not to
permit the tactical program suggested by General Blamey.’ Charges were raised
in the Australian press that these Australian operations were not adequately
equipped, supplied, and supported. These criticisms were not attacks upon
MacArthur, since they concerned ‘the adequacy of Australian equipment and
procedures,’ which were matters beyond the scope of MacArthur’s authority. And
upon investigation, the charges were revealed to have been unfounded.”

JOSEPH FORBES

Pittsburgh, Pa.
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